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CONTRACT-PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-MUTUALITY OF OBLIGA-
TION.-Plaintff demands an accounting for commissions alleged to
have been earned under an oral contract by which plaintiff agreed to
develop the towns of Thompson, Bethel and Fallsburg in the County
of Sullivan as a market for defendant's milk products in consideration
for which defendant was to designate him as its exclusive distributing
agent in such territory and pay him as commissions one-half cent for
each quart of milk sold and one-quarter cent for each quart of cream
sold. The record discloses that the alleged oral contract was termi-
nated on April 3, 1935 by a letter from defendant to plaintiff. The
defendant contends that its promise to pay commissions in exchange
for plaintiff's promise to obtain markets is of no legal consequence,
for it was void for lack of mutuality and cannot be upheld.' Held,
where the obligation of a unilateral promise is suspended for want of
mutuality at its inception, still on performance by the promisee a con-
sideration arises which relates back to the making of the promise, and
it becomes obligatory. The agreement was unilateral as to duration
and could be terminated by either party at any time. Nathzan Rubin
v. Dairymen's League Co-operative Association, Inc., 284 N. Y. 32,
29 N. E. (2d) 458 (1940).
Mutuality of obligation is not essential to render a party liable
on a contract. If there is a consideration for his undertaking, he is
bound,2 and it is not pertinent to the existence of a consideration for
a promise that mutuality of obligation should exist between the par-
ties at the time of the making of the promise.3 An act voluntarily
performed in compliance with the proposition and in consideration of
a promise by another is a sufficient consideration to render the con-
tract binding.4 In a decision by the New York Court of Appeals,5
the law was stated to be that a promise, though void when made for
want of mutuality of obligation, becomes binding when the promisee
performs the consideration for which the promise was made; and the
consideration created by such performance relates back to the original
agreement. If one side of an agreement, which was originally too
vague for enforcement, becomes definite by entire or partial perform-
ance, the other side of the agreement (or a divisible part thereof,
corresponding to the performance received) though originally unen-
forceable, becomes binding.6 In the, instant case the court found that
1 Terre Haute Brewing Co. v. Dugan, 102 F. (2d) 425 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939);
Heaman v. Rowell Co., 261 N. Y. 229, 185 N. E. 83 (1933).
2 justice v. Lang, 42 N. Y. 493 (1870) ; Grossman v. Schenker, 206 N. Y.
466, 100 N. E; 39 (1912).
3 Thomas-Huycke-Martin Co. v. Gray, 94 Ark. 9, 125 S. W. 659 (1910);
Marie v. Garrison, 83 N. Y. 74 (1880); Hoffman v. Mafiali, 104 Wis. 630,
80 N. W. 1032 (1899).
4 Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 118 X. E. 214 (1917)
(contract granting the exclusive right to sell grantor's designs for one-half the
profits held not to be void for want of mutuality).
5 Lynch v. Murphy, 221 N. Y. 557, 116 N. E. 1059 (1914).
6 Parks v. Griffith & Boyd Co., 123 Md. 232, 91 Atl. 581 (1914) ; Raymond
v. White, 119 Mich. 438, 78 N. W. 469 (1899) ; Chard v. Ryan-Parker Con-
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the contract was "unilateral as to time and hence could be terminated
by either party at any time." 7 It is a well settled rule of law that a
contract of agency, which leaves the agent free to terminate his rela-
tions with the principal upon reasonable notice, must be construed to
confer the same rights upon the principal, unless provisions to the
contrary are stipulated.8 The plaintiff contends that the evidence
presented by the defendant and accepted by the jury was insufficient
to show a termination of the contract and he should recover commis-
sions to the time of the present trial. However, a finding or a judg-
ment by the court on facts will not be disturbed, if there is any
evidence fairly tending to support it, or if sustained by sufficient evi-
dence, or substantially supported by the evidence, 9 and the Court of
Appeals so found in the instant case.
S.C.
CORPORATIONS-RECOVERY OF DECLARED DIVIDENDS-STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS.-Plaintiffs, executors of the estate of Thomas L.
Jacques, deceased, seek to recover the amount of unpaid dividends on
100 shares of preferred stock of the defendant corporation together
with interest. During the period from 1906 to 1938, one H. C. Lloyd
was the owner of record of 100 shares of preferred stock of defendant
corporation. In 1913 decedent, Thomas L. Jacques, acquired the
stock certificate upon the death of his father, who evidently obtained
the certificate by transfer from H. C. Lloyd. Jacques held the certifi-
cates from 1913 until his death in 1931. Until 1938 no attempt was
made to present the certificate for transfer on the books of the defen-
dant corporation. The defendant corporation from 1914 to 1922
declared dividends on this stock. After the declaration of dividends
no sum was set aside from the corporate assets for their ultimate pay-
ment. Entry was made on the books of the corporation of the total
struction Co., 182 App. Div. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 622 (1st Dept. 1918); 1
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 106 ("A promise that was originally
too indefinite may by performance become definite and as to the other party to
the bargain must be regarded as continuously assenting to receive such per-
formance in return for his promise, a valid unilateral contract arises on receipt
of such performance.").
7Nathan Rubin v. Dairymen's League Co-operative Association, Inc., 284
N. Y. 32, 38, 29 N. E. (2d) 458, 460 (1940) ; cf. Lady Duff Gordon, 222 N. Y.
88, 118 N. E. 214 (1917); Ehrenworth v. Stuhmer & Co., Inc., 229 N. Y. 210,
128 N. E. 10 (1920) (This case must be differentiated from the instant case,
for herein it was agreed in writing that the contract was to last as long as both
parties were in business. The default was by the defendant who was still in
business and bound by the terms of the agreement, hence the plaintiff recovered
damages to the date of the trial.).8 Wilcox & Gibbs Sewing Machine Co. v. Ewing, 141 U. S. 627, 12 Sup. Ct.
94 (1891); Martin v. The New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N. Y. 117, 42 N. E.
416 (1895) ; Winslow v. Mayo, 195 N. Y. 551, 88 N. E. 1135 (1909).
9 Batchelor v. Hinkle, 210 N. Y. 243, 104 N. E. 629 (1914).
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